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I NT R ODUC T I ON   
The fighting words exception to the First Amendment has a long vintage.1  The 
U.S. Supreme Court created the doctrine nearly eighty years ago in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.2  The Court famously defined fighting words as words “which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or [cause] an immediate breach of the peace.”3  The 
Court applied the concept to uphold the breach-of-the-peace conviction of a 
Rochester, New Hampshire-based Jehovah’s Witness, Walter Chaplinsky, who 
allegedly cursed a local marshal.4  The New Hampshire breach-of-the-peace statute 
was quite broad, stating that “no person shall address any offensive, derisive, or 
annoying word to any other person . . . .”5  However, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court interpreted the statute to apply only to fighting words — the first time an 
appeals court had ever used the term “fighting words.”6  The U.S. Supreme Court 
accepted this narrow construction and famously declared:  
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.7  
Since Chaplinsky, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently invalidated 
convictions in subsequent fighting words decisions.  Most famously, the Court 
ruled that Paul Robert Cohen did not engage in fighting words when he wore a 
jacket to a Los Angeles County Courthouse bearing the words “Fuck the Draft.”8  The 
Court explained that the jacket with the profane word was not a “direct personal 
insult.”9  The Court also noted that there was “no showing that anyone who saw 
 
1  David L. Hudson, Jr., Fighting Words Case Still Making Waves in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
Freedom F. Inst., Mar. 9, 2012, https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2012/03/09/fighting-
words-case-still-making-waves-in-first-amendment-jurisprudence/ [https://perma.cc/8BNS-
343Z].  
2  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).   
3  Id. at 572.   
4  Id. at 569, 574.  
5  Id. at 569.   
6  David L. Hudson, Jr., Fighting Words, in Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom 
of Speech § 3:6 (2012).   
7  Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
8  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
9  Id. at 20.   
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Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that [Cohen] intended such a result.”10   
A few years later, the Court in Lewis v. New Orleans11 reversed the conviction of a 
New Orleans woman who had cursed at police officers for arresting her son.  She 
was charged with violating an ordinance prohibiting the use of “obscene or 
opprobrious language” toward police officers.12  The Court deemed the ordinance 
unconstitutionally overbroad.13  In a concurring opinion, Justice Lewis Powell wrote 
that “a properly trained police officer may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a 
higher degree of restraint’ than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to 
respond belligerently to ‘fighting words.’”14 
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in City of Houston v. Hill,15 a case 
involving a man who was arrested for protesting the arrest of a friend.  The police 
arrested the individual for violating a city ordinance that prohibited individuals 
from interfering with officers’ official duties.16  After being acquitted in municipal 
court, the man filed a civil rights lawsuit against the city.17  The city argued that the 
ordinance prohibited “core criminal conduct.”18  
The High Court disagreed with Justice William Brennan, famously writing: 
“The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without 
thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish 
a free nation from a police state.” 19   The Court concluded that the Houston 
ordinance “criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, 
and accords the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement.”20 
A couple years later, the Supreme Court also rejected the idea that a Texas flag 
desecration law could be justified under the fighting words doctrine in Texas v. 
Johnson.21  The five-member majority emphasized that Gregory Lee Johnson did not 
engage in fighting words when he burned an American flag in connection with the 
 
10  Id.  
11  Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
12  Id. at 132.   
13  Id. at 131-32. 
14  Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring). 
15  City of Houston, Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 453-54 (1987).  
16  Id. at 454-55.  
17  Id. at 455. 
18  Id. at 469. 
19  Id. at 462-63.  
20  Id. at 466.   
21  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989).  
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Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas.22   Texas officials argued that 
burning the flag constituted fighting words.23  But Justice Brennan wrote that “[n]o 
reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of 
dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal 
insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.”24 
A few years later, the Court invalidated the conviction of a juvenile who was 
prosecuted for burning a cross in the yard of a neighboring African-American 
family.25  The law prohibited burning crosses or other hate symbols “which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”26 
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the law, reasoning that it applied only to 
fighting words. 27   However, the U.S. Supreme Court—in an opinion by Justice 
Antonin Scalia—reasoned that the state committed viewpoint discrimination by 
choosing to punish only certain types of fighting words.28 
The fighting words doctrine has always been controversial, as it allows for the 
punishment of individuals for engaging in offensive, obnoxious, and repugnant 
expression.29  The doctrine has been vigorously criticized.  Professor Burton Caine 
termed it a “tragedy for the jurisprudence of Freedom of Speech.”30  Many other 
scholars have questioned the vitality of the doctrine, frequently noting that post-
Chaplinsky the Court has never sustained a conviction in a fighting words case.31  
 
22  Id.   
23  Id. at 407-08. 
24  Id. at 409.   
25  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992).   
26  Id. at 380.  
27  Id. at 380-81. 
28  Id. at 391.   
29  David L. Hudson, Jr., Connecticut High Court Reverses Woman’s Conviction for Profanity Uttered 
at Store, Freedom F. Inst., July 27, 2017, https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2017/07/26/
connecticut-high-court-reverses-womans-conviction-for-profanity-uttered-at-store/ 
[https://perma.cc/GC3Z-JUV3] (noting that “[t]he fighting words doctrine is a controversial 
aspect of free-speech jurisprudence, because it allows for the punishment of individuals for 
intemperate, offensive speech.”).  
30  Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First 
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 441, 443 (2004).   
31  Erwin Chemerinsky & Howard Gillman, Free Speech on Campus 40 (2017) (noting that 
the U.S. Supreme Court hasn’t sustained a fighting words conviction in more than seventy years); 
Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment Compass: Navigating the Free Speech Clause with a Five-Step 
Analytical Framework, 29 Sw. U. L. Rev. 223, 256 (2000) (“Chaplinsky is the first and last decision in 
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But the fighting words doctrine is alive and well in the lower courts.32  The first 
part of this article briefly has explained how the fighting words doctrine fared in the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  These results would seem to indicate that it would be rare 
indeed for a defendant’s words to fall under the fighting words exception.  That is 
not always the case.  The next part of this article provides a sampling of decisions in 
which lower courts have rejected First Amendment-based defenses to disorderly 
conduct, breach of the peace, or similar charges based on the fighting words 
doctrine.  The final part of the essay then explains the specific factors or facts that 
cause lower courts to find that certain expression constitutes unprotected fighting 
words rather than protected speech.   
I .  L OWE R  C OUR T  C AS E S  F I N DI NG T HAT  S P E E C H  C ONS T I T UT E S  
F I GHT I NG WOR DS    
A. State v. Harvey33 
In November 1998, a special response team with the Marion, Ohio Police 
Department executed an arrest warrant on an individual. 34   When the police 
emerged from the home with the individual arrested, a neighbor, Marcus G. Harvey, 
came out to the scene and began shouting at the arresting officers.35  He yelled “F 
you guys,” “Let me see an F’ing search warrant,” “This is a declaration of war,” and 
“This means war.”36   The police then arrested Harvey who had his hands in his 
pocket.37  Harvey had his hands on his key fob and refused to let go.38  The officers 
 
which the Supreme Court has ever affirmed a fighting words conviction.”); Linda Friedlieb, 
Comment, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 385, 389 (2005) (noting that the “Supreme Court has never affirmed another fighting words 
conviction”); Aviva O. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and 
Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 
793, 795 (1994) (“Yet, in the half century following the Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine, 
no convictions in cases in which a defendant was prosecuted under a fighting words statute have 
been upheld.”).   
32  Chris Demaske, Social Justice, Recognition Theory and the First Amendment: A New Approach to 
Hate Speech Restriction, 24 Comm. L. & Pol’y  347, 368 n.102 (“While the Supreme Court has moved 
away from the fighting words doctrine, it continues to be used vigorously by the lower courts.”).  
33  State v. Harvey, No. 9-19-34, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 283, at *1 (Feb. 3, 2020).  
34  Id.  
35  Id. at *2.   
36  Id.   
37  Id. at *2-3.   
38  Id. at *3-4.   
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eventually tased Harvey and took him into custody.39 
A “jury found Harvey guilty of one count of resisting arrest and one count of 
persistent disorderly conduct.”40  On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his 
convictions.41  With regard to the persistent disorderly conduct charge, the appeals 
court analyzed whether Harvey had engaged in fighting words.42  The appeals court 
noted that a key factor in such cases was whether the defendant engaged in “hostile 
or threatening” conduct when making the profane statements.43   Another key factor 
noted by the appeals court was whether the defendant continued uttering profane 
statements after being ordered to stop.44   
The appeals court emphasized that Harvey’s conduct was crucial to the decision 
to arrest him: “The testimony of the police officers indicates that Harvey’s conduct 
alongside his profane utterances and aggressive demeanor were the impetus for the 
police to arrest him for disorderly conduct.”45  The appeals court also focused on the 
fact that “Harvey approached the police in an aggressive and agitated manner.”46  
Ultimately, the appeals court concluded that Harvey’s statements constituted 
fighting words and affirmed his conviction.47 
B. State v. Hale48 
In October 2016, Jason Hale and his wife entered a gas station in Oak Harbor, 
Ottawa County, Ohio. 49   Hale was employed by the Ottawa County Sheriff’s 
Department.50  Hale encountered Officer Eric Parker and Sergeant Joshua Couts 
who were employed by the Oak Harbor Police Department.51  Hale allegedly yelled 
“Fuck you, Parker” at Officer Parker and then yelled “Suck my dick, Parker” as he 
 
39  Id. at *4.  
40  Id. at *5.   
41  Id. at *1.  
42  Id. at *19.   
43  Id. at *10.   
44  Id. at *10-11.  
45  Id. at *13.  
46  Id. at *18.   
47  Id. at *19.   
48  State v. Hale, No. OT-17-023, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1576, at *1 (April 13, 2018).  
49  Id. at *1-2. 
50  Id. at *2. 
51  Id. at *1-2. 
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came near the cashier.52  Hale then yelled “you’re a coward” at Parker as he left the 
store.53 
At the time that Hale yelled these profanities, there were women with small 
children in the convenience store.54  A store employee testified that Hale was “very 
loud” and that it unnerved her.55  Hale was later charged with disorderly conduct.56  
Following a bench trial, the court found Hale guilty.57   
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.58  The appeals 
court noted that Hale repeatedly directed “obscene remarks” at Officer Parker in a 
manner that was “provoking.”59  The court noted that the words “would reasonably 
incite the average person to retaliate.”60 
C. State v. Krueger61 
Defendant Chad Harold Krueger was sitting at a bar when he saw his sister-in-
law, with whom he had an acrimonious relationship.62  He told his friend that his 
sister-in-law was a “f-cking c-nt.”63  He then began to scream various profanities at 
her over and over.64  The sister-in-law left the bar; but Krueger continued to shout 
at her, telling her she “was so f-cking stupid that he couldn’t even believe [she] was 
alive.”65  A police officer approached and Krueger continued yelling at his sister-in-
law.66 
The officer arrested Krueger for disorderly conduct, and a jury later found him 
guilty.67  On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that several 
 
52  Id. at *2-3. 
53  Id. at *3.   
54  Id. at *4.   
55  Id. at *4-5.   
56  Id. at *1. 
57  Id. at *5.   
58  Id. at *1.   
59  Id. at *8.   
60  Id. at *8-9.   
61  State v. Krueger, A17-s0081, 2017 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1047, at *1 (Dec. 18, 2017). 
62  Id.  
63  Id. at *1-2.  
64  Id. at *2.   
65  Id.  
66  Id.  
67  Id. at *2, *7.   
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witnesses testified to Krueger’s profane and loud statements to his sister-in-law.68  
The court concluded, “Krueger’s statements were likely to provoke violence for 
several reasons: his extreme volume and vulgarity, he leaned in toward [the sister-
in-law] as he spoke, and he followed [her] outside of the bar and continued to yell 
vulgar and taunting remarks.”69 
D. State v. Nelson70 
Jeffrey Kevin Nelson entered a liquor store and had a heated verbal 
confrontation with the store clerk working behind the cash register.71  Nelson, who 
had prior altercations with the clerk and the clerk’s wife, called the clerk a “f--king 
a--hole” and a “piece of sh-t” in the presence of about ten to fifteen customers.72  The 
clerk told Nelson to leave, but Nelson continued to curse and refused to leave.73 
A police sergeant received a report of a “customer harassing an employee or 
causing a disturbance at the liquor store.” 74   The officer arrested Nelson for 
disorderly conduct and a trial court found Nelson guilty.75 
On appeal, Nelson argued that the fighting words doctrine was “archaic” and 
that his speech was protected by the First Amendment.76  The Minnesota Court of 
Appeals rejected that argument, writing that “[t]he ‘fighting words’ category of 
unprotected speech remains good law and is appropriate for application in this 
case.”77 
The appeals court determined that Nelson’s profanities at the store clerk were 
the type of face-to-face personal insults that fall within the ambit of the fighting 
words doctrine.78  The appeals court explained: “A store clerk at his place of work 
should not be expected to tolerate the same level of abuse as a trained police officer 
who often deals with intoxicated or mentally ill persons.”79 
 
68  Id. at *1, *16-17.   
69  Id. at *18.   
70  State v. Nelson, No. A14-0356, 2014 Minn. App. LEXIS 1305 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014). 
71  Id. at *1–2. 
72  Id. at *1–2.   
73  Id. at *2. 
74  Id. at *3.   
75  See id. at *3.   
76  Id. at *4–5.  
77  Id. at *5.  
78  Id. at *7–8.  
79  Id. at *9–10.  
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E. In Re J.K.P.80  
The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court’s finding of delinquency 
for disorderly conduct when a juvenile yelled the N-word at another juvenile.81  The 
court noted that the recipient of the communication was offended by the use of the 
racial slur.82  The court also quoted the North Carolina Supreme Court’s following 
language: “No fact is more generally known than that a white man who calls a black 
man a ‘nigger’ within his hearing will hurt and anger the black man, and often 
provoke him to confront the white man and retaliate.”83 
F. Rebel v. Rebel84 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a couple engaged in 
disorderly conduct when they approached the husband’s former spouse and used 
vulgar and abusive language.85  Jesse and Brandi Rebel, a married couple, were upset 
at Jesse’s former spouse, Wendy Rebel.86  They believed that Wendy lied about Jesse 
being the father of her two children.87 
Jesse and Brandi Rebel approached Wendy Rebel in her car and began shouting 
at her.88   Brandi called Wendy a “fucking liar” and told her “she was not brave 
enough to get out of the car.”89  Brandi later posted on Facebook that Wendy was 
“shaking so bad I thought she was having a seizure and I’m positive she pissed 
herself!”90 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a disorderly conduct restraining 
order against Jesse and Brandi, who argued that their speech was constitutionally 
protected.91  The state high court disagreed, writing that the district court did not 
err in finding that “Wendy Rebel’s safety, security, and privacy were compromised 
 
80  In re J.K.P., No. 108,617, 2013 Kan. App. LEXIS 185 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2013). 
81  Id. at *5–6, 13. 
82  Id. at *8. 
83  Id. at *8–9 (quoting In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 699 (N.C.1997)). 
84  Rebel v. Rebel, 837 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 2013).  
85  Id. at 353.   
86  Id.  
87  Id. 
88  Id.  
89  Id. at 356.   
90  Id.  
91  Id. at 359. 
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by the Rebels’ threatening actions and that the language used to get her out of the 
vehicle constituted ‘fighting words’ with no legitimate First Amendment purpose.92 
G. In Re H.K.93 
Juvenile H.K. and two others followed T.K., an African-American girl, into a 
bathroom at a teen center in Valley City, North Dakota.94  H.K. started yelling at T.K. 
and called her a “nigger” on multiple occasions.95  H.K. allegedly told T.K. she better 
watch out because she did not want her kind in this town.96  After this incident, T.K. 
also ran into H.K. at a local restaurant where H.K. once again referred to her by the 
same racial slur.97 
Authorities charged H.K. with disorderly conduct.98  Her attorney argued that 
the state was attempting to criminalize the use of the racial slur.99  The juvenile 
court adjudicated H.K. delinquent.100  On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed.101  The court noted that H.K. did more than utter a single racial epithet but 
“repeatedly” uttered the racial slur. 102   The court reasoned that “an objectively 
reasonable person would find the totality of H.K.’s statements constituted explicit 
and implicit threats that were likely to incite a breach of the peace or violent reaction 
and alarm the listener.”103 
H. McCormick v. City of Lawrence104  
A federal district court in Kansas determined that two individuals who filmed 
police activity at traffic stops and yelled at officers during those stops uttered 
 
92  Id.  
93  Cruff v. H.K. (In re H.K.), 778 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 2010).  
94  Id. at 767. 
95  Id.  
96  Id. 
97  Id.  
98  Id.  
99  Id. 
100  Id.  
101  Id.  
102  Id. at 770.   
103  Id.  
104  McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (D. Kan. 2004). 
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fighting words.105  In one instance, the police conducted a traffic stop of a driver.106  
The plaintiff filmed the police at a McDonald’s about thirty to forty feet away.107  As 
the police were conducting the stop, the plaintiff filmed them and unleashed a 
torrent of profanity, such as “Mother F***ers,” “F***ing pigs,” and “Leave her the 
f*** alone.” 108   The plaintiff then approached within ten to fifteen feet of the 
officers, causing one of the officers to ask whether the plaintiff was interfering with 
his investigation.109  The officers then arrested the plaintiff for interfering with 
their official duties.110 
Another similar incident that occurred involved one of the same plaintiffs, who 
saw an officer conducting a sobriety checkpoint. 111   This time, the plaintiff 
approached the officer, once again filming the police activity.112  The officer warned 
the plaintiff not to come closer and interfere with a police investigation.113  During 
the course of the interaction, the plaintiff yelled the following profanities at the 
officers: “‘oppressive, sick a ** holes,’ ‘jack-booted thugs,’ ‘Gestapo,’ ‘pieces of sh*t,’ 
‘sick, oppressive a ** holes,’ and ‘sick a ** holes,’ among other epithets.”114 
The plaintiffs challenged their arrests with a civil rights lawsuit.115  The officers 
responded by pleading qualified immunity as a defense.116  The federal district court 
ruled in favor of the officers, finding that the police officers were entitled to 
qualified immunity because the plaintiffs did not engage in protected speech.117  
Instead, the court determined that the plaintiffs engaged in fighting words.118  The 
court explained: “Although the facts regarding the proximity of Plaintiffs to 
Defendants and the volume of Plaintiffs’ remarks are controverted, the court 
concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiffs' speech was ‘inherently likely to produce 
 
105  Id. at 1197–98, 1201.    
106  Id. at 1196.  
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 1197.  
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 1198.  
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 1198–99.   
114  Id. at 1199. 
115  Id. at 1195. 
116  Id. at 1199. 
117  Id. at 1201–02.  
118  Id. at 1201. 
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a violent reaction.’” 119   The court emphasized that the plaintiffs “were not only 
showing their disapproval of police activity, but also making repeated personal 
attacks on the officers.”120 
I. County of Milwaukee v. Kiernan121  
John P. Kiernan took his wife to Mitchell International Airport in Wisconsin.122  
Kiernan’s wife set off the metal detector as she passed through security.123  Kiernan 
yelled at his wife to tell the security personnel that it was because of the screws in 
her hip.124  When Kiernan went to assist his wife, he crossed over the red-line tape.125  
A security officer told Kiernan to get back across the line, which caused Kiernan to 
respond that the officer ought to get back over the line.126   Kiernan allegedly cursed 
at the officers and put his hands on one of them.127 
The officers issued a citation to Kiernan for disorderly conduct.128  A trial court 
found him guilty.129  On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, noting 
witness testimony that Kiernan had told a police officer he would “kick [his] ass” 
and called him a “son of a bitch.”130  The appeals court reasoned that this language 
“clearly falls under the scope of ‘fighting words’ that could have incited a breach of 
the peace and have little social value.”131 
J. State v. Ovadal132  
Ralph Ovadal was part of a group that protested nudity at Mazomanie Beach in 
 
119  Id.  
120  Id. 
121  County of Milwaukee v. Kiernan, No. 02-1269, 2002 Wis. App. LEXIS 1994 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 
5, 2002). 
122  Id. at *1–2. 
123  Id. at *2. 
124  Id.   
125  Id.  
126  Id.  
127  Id. at *3.   
128  Id. 
129  Id.  
130  Id. at *6–7. 
131  Id. at *7.   
132  State v. Ovadal, No. 03-377-CR, 2003 Wis. App. LEXIS 947 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003). 
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Dane County, Wisconsin.133  The group generally protested in the beach parking lot 
located about a mile and a half from the beach.134  In May 2001, Ovadal and a group 
of others were protesting when they saw a woman get out of her car.135  A member 
of Ovadal’s group handed her a gospel tract. 136   The woman responded with 
profanity.137  The group then formed a semi-circle around the woman and started 
yelling at her to repent and called her names such as “whore,” “harlot,” and 
“Jezebel.”138 
The woman filed a complaint against Ovadal and the police later charged him 
with disorderly conduct.139  He pled not guilty and had a bench trial.140  The judge 
determined Ovadal was guilty of disorderly conduct.141 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 142   The 
appeals court noted that “Ovadal repeatedly shouted at [the woman] that she was a 
whore, harlot, and Jezebel” and that “in just over six minutes, he used these terms 
over thirty times.” 143   The appeals court concluded, “Ovadal’s statements had 
nothing to do with an exposition of ideas.  Instead, they were abusive fighting words 
and are not protected by the First Amendment.”144 
K. State v. C.D.145 
A 16-year-old juvenile, known in court papers as “C.D.,” faced juvenile 
delinquency charges for disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at a 
shopping mall in Tukwila, Washington.146  A mall security guard, who was also a 
reserve police officer, heard several individuals yelling and saw C.D. on a bench 
 
133  Id. at *1–2.   
134  Id. at *2.  
135  Id. 
136  Id.  
137  Id.  
138  Id. at *2, *5.   
139  Id. at *3.   
140  Id. at *3.  
141  Id. at *3.   
142  Id. at *1.  
143  Id. at *8.   
144  Id. at *8-9.   
145  State v. C.D., No. 018011911, 2002 WL 450467 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2002). 
146  Id. at *1.  
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yelling at four other individuals. 147   C.D. then called the officer “a nigger” and 
exhibited an aggressive demeanor.148  He also asked the officer “what the fuck are 
you doing” and called him “boy.”149 
The officer smelled alcohol on C.D.’s breath and asked him repeatedly to leave 
the mall.150  C.D. approached the officer with clenched fists, causing the officer to 
push C.D.151  The officer, then accompanied by another security officer, took C.D. 
into custody.152  The mall guards then called the police.153  In the mall security office, 
C.D. continued to be loud and argumentative.154  He was charged with disorderly 
conduct and a minor in possession.155 
A juvenile court adjudicated C.D. delinquent on both charges.156  On appeal, the 
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication. 157   The appeals court 
emphasized that context was key in determining whether the speech constituted 
fighting words.158  The appeals court also noted that C.D.’s language caused the mall 
security guard to push him.159  The court wrote, “Fighting words are no less offensive 
because they engender only the fear of violence and the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.”160  The appeals court also emphasized that C.D. had 
clenched his fists and uttered racial slurs.161 
L. State v. Deloreto162  
On June 9, 2000, Dante Deloreto was driving in his vehicle when he passed a 
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162  State v. Deloreto, No. CR000190119S, 2002 WL 316991 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2002).   
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  N E W  H A M P S H I R E  L A W  R E V I E W  1 9 : 1  ( 2 0 2 0 )  
16 
jogger who he knew was a police officer.163  He called the officer “an asshole” and 
flipped the officer off.164 He also told the officer, “Faggot, pig, I’ll kick your ass.”165  
Deloreto said he had a problem with the officer and others, who he had sued in a 
federal lawsuit.166  Deloreto then opened the door and jumped out of the car and 
yelled, “I’m going to kick your ass.”167 
A second incident occurred between Deloreto and another officer six days later 
at a convenience store.168  Deloreto approached the officer and raised his fist.169  He 
told the officer, “I’ll kick your ass, punk” several times.170  The officer did not arrest 
him on the spot, preferring to let the situation de-escalate.171 
Later, authorities charged Deloreto with two counts of breach of the peace for 
the two incidents.172  The Connecticut Superior Court wrote:  
The language used by the defendant in both incidents which threatened violence 
against the police officers, together with the threatening gestures by the defendant of 
raising and pumping his fist, were sufficient to support an inference that the defendant 
wished to provoke the policemen to violence, thereby removing his words and actions 
from first amendment protection.173 
M. In Re S.J.N-K174 
The South Dakota Supreme Court found that a juvenile committed disorderly 
conduct when he—in a car driven by his brother—flipped off and repeatedly yelled 
“fuck you” to his middle-school principal.175  The court emphasized that the juvenile 
unleashed a torrent of profanity and repeatedly made the profane gesture: “This was 
not merely the use of one profane word or one obscene gesture, it was an ongoing 
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164  Id. 
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167  Id. at *2.   
168  Id.  
169  Id.  
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172  Id. at *3.  
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174  In re S.J.N-K., 647 N.W.2d 707, 709 (S.D. 2002). 
175  Id. at 709.    
T H E  F I G H T I N G  W O R D S  D O C T R I N E  
17 
aggression that falls outside free speech protection.”176 
N. In Re John M.177    
The Arizona Court of Appeals sustained a juvenile court’s delinquency 
adjudication for disturbing the peace when the juvenile yelled a racial slur at an 
African-American female and threw  a soda can at her.178  The Arizona appeals court 
determined that the racial slur—the use of the N-word—was so inflammatory that 
it constituted fighting words.179  The appeals court explained: “We agree with the 
State that few words convey such an inflammatory message of racial hatred and 
bigotry as the term ‘nigger.’”180  The court also characterized the juvenile’s speech as 
“an unprovoked, personal attack on an innocent bystander.”181 
I I .  WHAT  F AC T OR S  C AN L E AD A C OUR T  T O F I N D  T HAT  S P E E C H I S  
F I GHT I NG WOR DS ?    
A. Aggressive Conduct In Addition to Speech  
If the defendant engages in aggressive conduct in addition to profane or 
intemperate speech, a reviewing court may focus on the conduct alone or consider 
the speech in conjunction with the unprotected conduct.  This implicates an 
important doctrine in First Amendment law—sometimes referred to as the speech-
conduct dichotomy. 182   Under this doctrine, there is a significant difference 
between protected speech and unprotected conduct.183  However, the doctrine is 
disfavored by First Amendment scholars because oftentimes activity involves both 
speech and conduct and to try to combine the two can undervalue speech.184 
The reality is that in a fighting words case, the government often will focus on 
the aggressive conduct, while the individual will assert that he or she engaged in 
pure speech.  Take the example of spitting—if a defendant curses at an officer and 
 
176  Id. at 712.   
177  In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).   
178  Id. at 425.  
179  Id. at 428-29.   
180  Id. at 428.  
181  Id. at 428.   
182  David L. Hudson, Jr. Freedom of Speech: Documents Decoded 91 (1st ed. 2017).    
183  Id. 
184  See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1488, 1495-96 (1975).   
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spits at the officer, a reviewing court is far more likely to find that the defendant 
engaged in disorderly conduct.185   
The conduct could be waving one’s hands, clenching one’s fists, or anything 
categorized as “hostile or threatening” conduct.  Recall the case of C.D. v. State, 
where the slur-uttering juvenile also had his fists clenched as he cursed at the mall 
security guard. 186   In State v. Deloreto, the court emphasized that alongside the 
profanity, the defendant had engaged in “threatening gestures” of “raising and 
pumping his fist” when approaching the officer.187  Similarly, in State v. Harvey, the 
Ohio Court of Appeals focused on Mr. Harvey’s “hostile or threatening” conduct in 
finding that his speech was fighting words. 188   Furthermore, Mr. Harvey 
approached the police in “an aggressive and agitated manner.”189 
B. Volume of the Speech  
The louder the speech, the more likely that a court may use that fact to support 
a disorderly conduct conviction based on the fighting words doctrine.  In State v. 
Hale, the Ohio Court of Appeals emphasized the witness testimony that Mr. Hale 
was “very loud” when he uttered his profanities.190  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
also emphasized the “extreme volume” of Mr. Krueger, the man who repeatedly 
cursed at his sister-in-law, in upholding his disorderly conduct conviction.191 
C. Repeated Profanities   
Profanity generally is protected speech under First Amendment 
jurisprudence.192  However, the sheer number and intensity of the profanities may 
cause a reviewing court to find that the intemperate speech crosses the line into 
unprotected fighting words.  Recall that in State v. Hale, the off-duty sheriff’s deputy 
 
185  See State v. York, 732 A.2d 859, 860 (Me. 1999) (noting that “Defendant's conduct included not 
just speech, but also the physical acts of declining obstreperously to leave the building . . . and 
attempting to spit [on the recipient].”  
186  State v. C.D., No. 018011911, 2002 WL 450467 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2002). 
187  State v. Deloreto, No. CR000190119S, 2002 WL 316991 at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2002). 
188  State v. Harvey, No. 9-19-34, 2020 WL 525933 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2020). 
189  Id. at *7.   
190  State v. Hale, 110 N.E.3d 890, 893 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
191  State v. Krueger, No. 14-CR-16-1342, 2017 WL 6418219 at *1, *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018). 
192  See David L. Hudson, Jr., Anti-Profanity Laws and the First Amendment, 42 T. 
Marshall L. Rev. 203, 203 (2018) (“Profanity generally should be protected by the First 
Amendment.”).   
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was found to have engaged in fighting words when he repeatedly cursed at a local 
police officer in a convenience store.193  Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
upheld Mr. Ovadal’s disorderly conduct conviction in part because he called his 
victim “whore,” “harlot,” and “Jezebel” thirty times in about six minutes. 194   The 
South Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that a juvenile engaged in an “ongoing 
aggression” of repeated profanities.195  The federal district court in Kansas in the 
McCormick case listed all of the various profanities uttered by the plaintiffs and 
emphasized the “repeated personal attacks” the plaintiffs made against the police 
officers.196 
D. Recipient of the Communication  
The recipient of the communication matters in many fighting words cases.  
Many courts do follow the principle that Justice Powell advocated in his concurring 
opinion in Lewis v. New Orleans—that police officers are expected to exercise 
greater restraint when confronted with hostile words.197    
But if the recipient of the hostile expression is not a police officer, a court is 
more likely to find that the speech constitutes fighting words.  For example, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals emphasized that store clerks—unlike police officers—
should not be expected to “tolerate the same level of abuse.”198  Furthermore, courts 
are seemingly more willing to find that a defendant engaged in fighting words 
when the recipient is someone with whom the defendant has a familial relationship, 
as opposed to law enforcement.199 
E. Racial slurs—especially the “N-word”  
Racial slurs can constitute fighting words.200  Scholar William C. Nevin explains 
 
193  Hale, 110 N.E.3d. at 894.   
194  State v. Ovadal, No. 03-377-CR, 2003 LEXIS 947, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct 7, 2003). 
195  In re S.J.N.-K, 647 N.W.2d 707, 712. (S.D. 2002).  
196  McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1197, 1201 (D. Kan. 2004). 
197  Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (U.S. 1974) (J. Powell, concurring). 
198  State v. Nelson, No. 13-CR-13-107, 2014 WL 7237043, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014). 
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that store managers are in the same 
position as police officers when it comes to fighting words – they are expected to be used to hostile 
situations.  See State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 14 (Conn. 2017).   
199  See, e.g., Rebel v. Rebel, 837 N.W.2d 351 (N.D. 2013).   
200  William C. Nevin, Fighting Slurs: Contemporary Fighting Words and the Question of Criminally 
Punishable Racial Epithets, 14 First Amend. L. Rev. 127, 158 (2015).   
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that sometimes courts hold racial slurs to be protected speech, sometimes they hold 
them to be fighting words, and sometimes racial slurs are fighting words depending 
on the specific context.201   
Of all the racial slurs, the N-word carries the most significance in fighting 
words cases.   Harvard Law Professor Randall Kennedy has explained the special 
nature of the N-word in American law and society.202  Kennedy, in an earlier piece 
of scholarship, explains:  
Any person in the United States should be aware of the N-word.  Ignorance could be very 
costly.  Failing to recognize it as the signal of danger that it often is could well lead to 
injury, just as using it unaware of its effects and consequences could well cost a person 
his reputation, his job, or even his life.203 
The N-word represents the ultimate fighting word.  In the words of one scholar, 
“it carries the force of generations of racial tyranny.” 204   The North Carolina 
Supreme Court accurately wrote years ago: “No fact is more generally known than 
that a white man who calls a black man ‘a nigger’ within his hearing will hurt and 
anger the black man, and often provoke him to confront the white man and 
retaliate.”205  In many juvenile adjudication cases, courts have affirmed the finding 
of delinquency for those juveniles who uttered the N-word at their victims.206   
I I I .  C ONC L US I ON  
The fighting words doctrine remains a vibrant and controversial part of First 
Amendment law.  While the U.S. Supreme Court has not affirmed a fighting words 
conviction since that of Walter Chaplinsky’s in 1942, the doctrine remains alive and 
well in the lower courts.  Courts that affirm a disorderly conduct or breach of the 
peace conviction are more likely to emphasize a defendant’s aggressive conduct, a 
defendant’s loud volume, the repeated profanities of the defendant, the reaction of 
the recipient of the communication, and noxious racial slurs. 
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